From ashes to ashes

At first we’re not sure if this is the right place. The building we are standing in front of appears to be derelict. Most of the windows are without glass, the elevator is boarded up and the staircase leading up through all nine floors is cracked and broken. Nearby some young boys, no more than 14, sit on a bench smoking cigarettes and ask us who we are looking for. When we tell them, they respond that we are in the right place, this is the home of Badri Iosebashvili

After climbing what seems like more than a hundred uneven steps up to the top floor and walking through an unlit hallway, Iosebashvili, 23, greets us in front of a peeling wooden door with a shy smile and shows us into his humble abode.

“Humble” is probably an exaggeration here. The apartment is spacious by Georgian standards, but the big, single-pane windows and lack of central heating mean that the family, which consists of Iosebashvili, his mother, wife and 19-month-old son Merab, can only really live comfortably in one room. The rest of the apartment is colder than it is outside and we can see our breath evaporate into the air.

We file into the cramped living room, which doubles as a bedroom, dining room, and even a kitchen, and find places to sit, trying to avoid the couple’s bed. There is a strong smell of gasoline from the small heating element, mixed with severe rising damp seeping down from the blackened ceiling. In the corner a small, old-fashioned TV set gives off blurred images. Maka, Iosebashvili’s young wife, holds the baby tightly.
“He has a slight fever,” she sighs as if to apologize for his somber mood. “He usually has more life than this.”

Iosebashvili, whose father was Jewish, takes over the interview, explaining that “this is the only room in the apartment we can use. We only have one heater and it’s too cold everywhere else.”

Later he shows me another room that could possibly be a bedroom if only the family had enough money to heat or furnish it.

Iosebashvili, who has lived in this apartment his entire life, inherited it when his father died, but the fact that he does not have to pay rent does not make life in Gori – a town of some 50,000 residents located roughly 30 minutes’ drive north of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, any easier.

“Things were getting better before the war,” laments Iosebashvili, who worked part-time doing odd jobs before the brewing conflict between Georgia and Russia reached a head in August. “I did have some work before then, but now no one has any money to hire me. I’ve been looking but there’s nothing.”

During the conflict, the town, which happens to be the birthplace of Joseph Stalin, came under heavy bombardment from Russian air strikes. Many families, Iosebashvili’s included, were forced to flee their homes and took refuge in Tbilisi. The Russian army took over the area with ease.

The war, which lasted from August 7-12 and was fought in the border areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a short distance north of Gori, has left an uneasy peace across the region and caused a serious deterioration in living conditions, with hunger and atrocious accommodation topping the list.

However, for many of the country’s 15,000 Jews, Georgia is still the only home they have known, and the efforts of the last 20 years to rebuild the community really shone through during the conflict, with many people committed to making it even stronger.

The truth is that those who wanted to emigrate to Israel have already done so – some 147 Georgian Jews made aliya in an effort to escape the escalating conflict with Russia – and for the rest, the reasons not to leave might vary slightly according to age but the final proclamation is usually the same: This is our home and we want to make life better here.

“I have many relatives in Israel,” says Diana, 19, who grew up in Gori but is now studying medicine in Tbilisi. “I was there over the summer when the war broke out here, but for the moment I like being here. My family is here and I am in the middle of my studies. For me to go now and learn a new language would not be practical.”

This sentiment is echoed by students active in Tbilisi’s Hillel organization. While most say they have been to Israel – either by way of the week-long experiential birthright program or privately to visit family – they feel that their future is to stay in Georgia and help reestablish the Jewish community.

“The economy in Georgia was progressing until the war broke out,” claims Vito, 18, an economics major at one of the local colleges. “The war was a stupid thing to have happened, but I think that I can help my people if I stay here.”

Another student, who is studying architecture and is part of Hillel’s Young Leadership program, chimes in: “When I finish studying, I want to help rebuild my community.”

“I see my future here,” says another of the students. “My country is developing and I am going to stay.”

“I can’t say that things are perfect here but at least I know where I am, I can speak the language and my friends and family are nearby,” says Ecka, a pharmacology student who also assists with the programming at Hillel.

WHILE the Hillel students find it difficult to express why they feel so connected to Israel or committed to being Jewish in Georgia, when asked about their experiences during the recent war, the descriptions of their actions speak louder than the words.

Their young eyes light up as they each delight in describing how they took turns to help out at Tbilisi’s Jewish community center, tracking down Jews from Gori, helping them find accommodation and driving round the city to provide them with food and healthcare packages.

“I worked with the children that came here from Gori,” says one of the female students. “We ran a summer camp for them and took them to places that would cheer them up. It was a very stressful situation for them. We had to build them a special program.”

Another describes how his family took in at least 25 close and distant relatives.

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The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted.

The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.

Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.

On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.

On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.

On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.

The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion

In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.

The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?

It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.

If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.

The Western Encirclement of Russia

To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.

That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.

The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.

Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.

Resurrecting the Russian Sphere

Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.

By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.

The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.

Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).

In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.

The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

Israel to boycott UN conference on human rights and racism

Israel will boycott the United Nations “Durban II” conference on human rights, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announced Sunday in Jerusalem at the annual meeting of the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism. The decision followed an assessment by the Foreign Ministry, and other Western governments, that it will be impossible to prevent the conference from turning into a festival of anti-Israeli attacks. South Africa hosted the first Durban conference in the summer of 2001 under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It was titled “The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,” but most of the discussions revolved around Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. 


The United States and Israel responded by lowering the level of their diplomatic representation and eventually quit the conference, which culminated in a resolution equating Zionism and racism. That conference also provided a framework for a global convention of non-governmental organizations, which became a platform for delegitimizing Israel. For the past few months, a coalition of Israeli and global Jewish organizations, together with government representatives, tried to prepare a joint policy for the follow-up conference, which is scheduled to take place in early 2009 at a still undecided venue. Among other things, there were talks with the foreign ministries of other countries and pressure on NGOs to guarantee that no anti-Semitic resolutions would be passed. However, it became clear there is little chance of effecting a change, among other reasons because the UN Human Rights Commission is chaired by Libya. Livni said Sunday that Israel had intended to try and influence the discussion “from within,” by taking an active role in international forums “and cooperating with those leaders and countries that don’t have a hidden agenda, and who truly want to promote human rights. But that policy is sometimes misinterpreted, and there are mistakes one must not repeat. Therefore I wish to make clear that Israel will not participate and will not grant legitimacy to the UN conference on racism unless there is proof that the conference will not become a platform for more anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic activity.” Livni called on the international community to boycott the conference, or else risk “legitimizing hatred, extremism and anti-Semitism under the guise of combating racism.” 

  Ref: Haaretz 

AMERICA THE STUPID (from the inside)